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OBSCENITY: THE INTRACTABLE
LEGAL PROBLEM
JOHN CORNELIUS HAYES *
L AST AUGUST, the editor of The Catholic Lawyer asked me to
comment on two 1968 decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, each dealing with the Federal constitutionality of local crim-
inal laws prohibiting the dissemination to youth of materials obscene
for youth though not obscene for adults. In the one case, a New
York statute met the test of Federal constitutionality,' but in the
other, a Dallas ordinance failed that test.2
The editor asked me about the cases because in 1962 I had
published for him a survey of a decade of decisions (mostly by the
United States Supreme Court) dealing with the Federal constitu-
tionality of laws seeking to control the dissemination of obscene
films and publications;' and he knew that I had since tried to keep
abreast of later developments in that constitutional area in my role
as occasional legal consultant for the National Office for Decent
Literature in Chicago. He probably did not know that I have also
published another law review article in this area under the uninten-
tional pseudonym of John Cornelius Levy, for which, to set the
record straight, I hereby acknowledge responsibility.4
My comment, in summary, is that the two cases are not incon-
sistent, either with each other or with Gault;' that the Dallas case,
while appearing from the majority opinion to be merely a throw-back
to a long line of decisions between 1952 and 1957 in which local
criminal laws were held unconstitutionally vague, really sheds new
light on those prior decisions, thanks largely to the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Harlan and to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas, in which Mr. Justice Black joined; and that the New York
case is another milestone on the road from primitivism to relative
sophistication in what Mr. Justice Harlan terms this intractable con-
stitutional legal problem.
* A.B., Georgetown University; J.D., Loyola University; Litt. D., Aquinas
College, Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law.
'Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
:'Hayes, Survey of A Decade of Decisions on The Law of Obscenity, 8
CATHOLIC LAW. 93 (1962).
4 Levy, A Position on the Control of Obscenity, 51 Ky. L.J. 641 (1963).
5 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
The Dallas Case
I deal first with the Dallas case. By
way of background, recall that, in 1952,
Burstyn , overruled the 1915 decision of
Mutual Film Corporation by holding
for the first time that films were within
the protection of the First Amendment.
On that basis, Burstyn then held that a
standard for the legal control of films ex-
pressed in terms of the adjective "sacri-
legious" was unconstitutionally vague.
There followed a five-year sequence of
decisions, both federal and state, in which
adjective after adjective in local laws
designed to control films (and then, later,
publications as well) was shot down as
unconstitutionally vague for materials
within First Amendment protection.
Finally, in 1957, in Roth and Alberts,"
the single adjective "obscene" was held,
for both local and Federal criminal laws:
(a) to describe material not within
First Amendment protection (because
textually the unconditional wording of
the First Amendment was not intended
in 179.1 as a literal absolute, and be-
cause functionally the obscene lacked
the slightest redeeming social impor-
tance, so that its prohibition did not
impair the protected social value of
freedom of expression); and
(b) to have been so adequately de-
fined and fleshed out with standards
by American case law as not to be
unconstitutionally vague in respect to
",Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236
U.S. 230 (1915).
S Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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such relatively unprotected materials
(presumably because it met the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive due
process test of adequately informing
all involved of the nature of the pro-
hibited acts and materials).
I say "relatively unprotected materials".
The constitutional significance of the dis-
tinction between materials protected by
the First Amendment (as applied to all
local governments by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)
and materials protected, not by the First
Amendment, but merely by the substan-
tive due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was not very
clearly delineated in Roth. One of the
chief contributions of GinsbergO (com-
mented on hereafter) is that, in my
opinion, it clarifies that distinction in
several respects.
If the material is within First Amend-
ment protection so that the highly
protected social value of freedom of
expression is involved, then, to justify
governmental control of that material,
the burden of proof is on the government;
and the evidence required to sustain that
burden must be scientifically verifiable
and not mere opinion evidence; and such
evidence must prove that a "clear and
present danger" exists to a social value
which, under the prevailing circumstances,
is of an even higher order of importance
to the common good than the value of
freedom of expression; and the method
and degree and duration of the control
involved must be limited precisely to the
extent necessary to cope with that "clear
9Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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and present danger".
If, on the other hand, the material
is not within First Amendment protection,
so that the social value of freedom of
expression is not involved, the burden of
proof is on the objector; his evidence
must prove that the government was
unreasonable (irrational) either in dis-
cerning an adverse relationship between
the common good and the material to
be controlled, or in its selection of the
method of control (either because the
selected method is irrelevant to the
control sought, or because the selected
method represents an unreasonable
"over-kill", or because the government
has formulated its control so loosely as
not reasonably to apprize the persons
involved as to the nature of the pro-
hibited conduct or materials); and the
counter-evidence of the government to
support its reasonableness (rationality)
need not be scientifically verifiable, but
may be mere opinion evidence, at least
when scientifically verifiable evidence
either does not exist or is so inconclusive
in respect to the constitutional issue
being raised as to make it impossible
to categorize the opinion as unreasonable
(irrational).
The Dallas ordinance here involved
provided for the classification of films,
prior to their initial exhibition in Dallas,
as "suitable" or "not suitable" for youths
under sixteen years of age. But the
suitability of a film for such youths did
not depend solely on the standard that
the film was or was not "obscene" for
such youths; if it had, the case would
have been like Ginsberg.10 In fact, how-
10 Id.
ever, under the ordinance, a film was
also "not suitable" if it portrayed, among
several other things, "sexual promiscuity",
a term defined neither in the ordinance l
nor in any constructions given to the term
either by the Dallas Board of Censors
or by the Texas courts. The holding is
that, as to a film within First Amendment
protection because it is not obscene,
the descriptive phrase "sexual promis-
cuity" is unconstitutionally vague; and
that the vices of such vagueness are not
rendered any the less objectionable by
the fact that the ordinance was designed
to protect children. Given the case pre-
cedents, the decision is routine. Mr.
Justice Harlan alone dissented, and he
solely on the basis of his own self-styled
"functional" approach (which he has
urged from the very beginning in Roth),
under which, as to state and local laws,
all that is required is that the law, even
as to material within First Amendment
protection, stopped short of being "prud-
ishly overzealous"; on that tolerant ap-
proach, Mr. Justice Harlan thought that
the concept of "sexual promiscuity" was
at least as precise as the concept of "ob-
scenity" in Roth.12
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent is en-
lightening, because it helps to make clear
that the basic problem has seldom been
with the adjectives used by the legisla-
tures. Most of the adjectives (or des-
criptive phrases such as "sexual promis-
cuity") were sufficiently precise to meet
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
due process test of reasonably apprizing
' A defect since remedied by an amendment.
12 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
all persons involved of the nature of the
prohibited acts or materials so as reason-
ably to enable actors to judge for them-
selves whether they were or were not
within the prohibited area. The real
trouble with the adjectives was that they
described materials within the protection
of the First Amendment so that the con-
trol of those materials, no matter how
reasonably described they may have been,
impaired the superior social value of
freedom of expression. Instead, however,
of saying that, the cases castigated the
adjectives as being "unconstitutionally
vague". To date (except for libel),
only "obscene" describes materials not
within First Amendment protection and
(by coincidence?) only "obscene" is not
"unconstitutionally vague". Mr. Justice
Harlan cannot see that "sexual promis-
cuity" is any more vague than "obscene",
and of course it is not. But the real
point is that, for the majority, "sexual
promiscuity" describes materials within
First Amendment protection, whereas, for
Mr. Justice Harlan, it describes materials
which a state may quarantine from
youths under sixteen without being
"prudishly overzealous".
Re-thinking Burstyn,13 is there really
anything fatally vague about the adjective
"sacrilegious"? The real prolem with it
is that it describes materials clearly within
First Amendment protection because, in
the free trade of ideas, "sacrilegious"
materials inevitably involve ideas as to
the existence of God, as to "whose God",
and so on. For that same reason, despite
13 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
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the dictum in Roth 14 as to blasphemy
not having been intended to be within
First Amendment protection, I would
expect that the adjective "blasphemous"
in a criminal statute prohibiting the sale
of blasphemous materials would be held
"unconstitutionally vague"-not, in my
opinion, because it is, but because it
describes materials within First Amend-
ment protection.
Significantly, Mr. Justice Douglas,
joined by Mr. Justice Black, filed a con-
curring opinion. He concurred, he said,
because of his position that the First
Amendment is always involved in the
censorship of anything. But, he added,
were it not for that position, he would
concur with Mr. Justice Harlan, because
''sexual promiscuity" is adequately precise
to meet the substantive due process re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
only. What it cannot do is meet the
test of collision with the First Amend-
ment's protection of freedom of expres-
sion.
The significance of the Dallas case,
therefore, lies for me in the light which
the dissenting and concurring opinions
throw upon the real thrust of the majority
opinion (and of the 1952-1957 cases
which it follows) in finding fault with
adjectives, most of which by hindsight
appear quite adequate to meet the sub-
stantive due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment alone.
I should, I think, now outline the
majority opinion in the Dallas case so
as to acquaint the reader with what I
now think is the misleading traditional
1' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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treatment of the problem of the descrip-
tive adjectives.
The Dallas ordinance" required an
exhibitor, prior to initial exhibition, to
propose to a Board of Censors that a
film be classified either as "suitable" or
as "not suitable" for young persons under
sixteen. The decision was then for the
Board. The ordinance was painstaking
in providing adjective due process and
prompt judicial superintendence, except
that it did not require the Board to give
reasons for its own "not suitable" classi-
fication or even to specify upon what
standard in the ordinance its classification
was based. If an exhibitor shows a "not
suitable" film, he may commit a mis-
demeanor (punishable by a fine of up
to $200) under any of several circum-
stances.
The ordinance defined "not suitable"
as follows: 16
(1) describing or portraying brutality,
criminal violence or depravity in a
manner which the Board judges
likely to incite or encourage crime
or delinquency by youths; or
(2) describing or portraying nudity be-
yond the customary limits of can-
dor in Dallas, or describing or
portraying sexual promiscuity or
extra-marital or abnormal sexual
relationships in a manner which
the Board judges likely to incite or
encourage delinquency or sexual
promiscuity by youths, or as likely
to appeal to the prurient interest
of youths.
15DALLAS, TEX., REV. CODE, CIV. & CRIM.
ORD., ch. 46A (1960).
1f DALLAS, TEX., REV. CODE, CIV. & GRIM.
ORD., ch. 46A-1(f) 1960).
It defined "likely to incite or encourage
crime, delinquency or sexual promiscuity
by youths" as involving, in the Board's
judgment, a substantial probability that
the fim would create the impression in
youths that such conduct is profitable,
desirable, acceptable, respectable, praise-
worthy, or commonly accepted. 7 And
it defined "likely to appeal to the prurient
interest of youths" as meaning that, in
the Board's judgment, the calculated or
dominant effect of the film on youths
was substantially to arouse their sexual
desire. The ordinance further provided
that, in determining that a fim was "not
suitable", the Board must consider the
film as a whole, and must determine
whether its harmful effects outweigh the
artistic or educational values which the
film might have for youths.'
Under this ordinance, the Board, con-
trary to the proposal of the exhibitor,
determined that a film was "not suitable".
The exhibitor refused to accept this clas-
sification, as did the distributor. The
Board thereupon promptly sought an in-
junction against each prohibiting any
showing of the film without compliance
with the requirements for a "not suitable"
film, on the ground that the film por-
trayed sexual promiscuity in a manner
likely to incite sexual promiscuity by
youths and likely to appeal to their pru-
17 Under Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S.
684 (1959), this standard would appear inade-
quate for a film within First Amendment pro-
tection because it was not obscene.
18The latter provision appears to conflict with
the decision in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964).
rient interest. No attempt was made,
however, to support the allegation of the
likelihood of the film to appeal to the
prurient interest of youths. The trial
court issued the injunction, and Texas
appellate courts affirmed. The United
States Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the phrase "sexual promis-
cuity" was unconstitutionally vague.
The opinion of the United States
Supreme Court runs as follows:
(1) Since films are within First
Amendment protection, precision
of regulation must be the touch-
stone.
(2) While it is constitutional to re-
quire that films be submitted to
a licensing Board prior to their
initial exhibition, this Court has
firmly insisted on adequate pro-
cedural safeguards and prompt
judicial superintendence.
(3) The vice of vagueness is particu-
larly pronounced when expression
is being subjected to licensing
as a form of prior restraint, be-
cause that is a process in which
we cannot leave too wide a play
to those administering the or-
dinance, especially since doing so
hampers effective judicial review
even when de novo, and pro-
motes erratic administration. In
addition, the First Amendment
interests involved here reach be-
yond those of the film makers,
distributors, and exhibitors and
beyond those of the youths to
those of adult filmgoers who will
be affected 'by any tendency
among film makers, distributors
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or exhibitors to play it safe under
the threat of this ordinance.
(4) Nor is vagueness any the less
objectionable simply because the
ordinance does not suppress but
merely requires classification;
nor because the ordinance is
designed to protect children.
Control of expression to a child
is unrelated to tolerable vague-
ness because the vices of lack of
guidance to expressioners, to ad-
ministrators, and to judicial
superintendents remain the same.
(5) In Ginsberg, we held that, owing
to its interest in youth, a State
may regulate dissemination to
youth of, and youth's access to,
material "harmful to minors"
though not to adults. But in
Ginsberg "harmful to minors"
was statutorily defined so as
specifically and narrowly to de-
fine the phrase in accord with
standards which we have estab-
lished for judging obscenity.
Here we merely hold that any
governmental regulation for youth
must meet the usual requirements
for narrowly drawn and reason-
able standards.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas and the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan have already been
presented.
The New York Case
I preface my comments on Ginsberg 19
by saying that the Federal constitutional
issues involved in the legal control of
'9Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
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obscenity appear to me to classify in one
of four categories:
(1) Problems relating to the substan-
tive definition of, and the stan-
dards for identifying, obscenity
and to the justification for any
legal control whatever.
(2) Problems relating to the method
of control selected by legislators
(e.g., post-publication criminal
prosecution; injunctive control
without interim seizure of the
materials; the prior restraint
method of licensing of films; the
use of administrative agencies to
determine the applicability of
standards to particular materials).
(3) Problems relating to adjective
due process involved in the select-
ed method of control (e.g.,
search warrant procedures; in-
terim seizure of materials pend-
ing judicial determination of their
obscenity; adequate notice and
hearing requirements to bar ex
parte proceedings; the necessity
for government to seek prompt
judicial superintendence in an
adversary proceeding; the neces-
sity for trial by jury).
(4) Problems relating to trial (the
necessity or admissibility of ex-
pert testimony as to contempor-
ary community standards of de-
cency; allocation of the burden
of proof) and to appellate re-
view, whether of determinations
of administrative agencies, of
juries, or of lower courts sitting
without a jury.
Ginsberg falls into the first category.
Mr. Justice Brennan, for the Court, for-
mulated the Federal constitutional issue
presented by the case as follows: the is-
sue is the Federal constitutionality on
its face of a New York criminal statute
which prohibits the sale to minors under
seventeen of material defined in the
statute as obscene for minors under
seventeen (irrespective of whether the
material would be obsence for persons
seventeen or over) by adapting to minors
under seventeen the definition and stand-
ards of obscenity developed by decisions
of this Court beginning with Roth in
1957 (emphasis mine).
To orient the case so as to appreciate
its contribution to the evolving law in
the first category of problems, a review
of the prior cases in this category is
appropriate.
(A) The modern American constitu-
tional definition of, and some of the
amplifying standards for the identification
of, obscenity were first established in
1957 in Roth,2 0 which discarded as ut-
terly inadequate the older English test
as formulated in Queen v. Hicklin.12
The definition of obscene material is
"material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest".
A footnote sets out the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code definition
of "prurient interest" as a "shameful or
20 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21 Queen v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
This English test was objectionable because
it was formulated in terms of the susceptible per-
son rather than the average person, in terms
of a part only rather than of the whole, and
in terms of a theme rather than of the domi-
nant theme.
morbid interest in nudity, sex or ex-
cretion". The footnote also expresses the
opinion that there is no significant dif-
ference between this judicial definition
and the definition then tentatively pro-
posed in the Model Penal Code: "A
thing is obscene if, considered as a
whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest . . . and if it goes sub-
stantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation
of such matters." The amplifying stan-
dard for identifying obscene material is
whether, to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the questioned ma-
terial, taken as a whole, appeals to prur-
ient interest.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Warren took the position to which
he has consistently adhered: government
may constitutionally punish only those
persons who are plainly engaged in the
commercial exploitation of the morbid
and shameful craving for materials having
a prurient effect. In Ginzburg, 2 2 this
factor of pandering, whether intrusive or
welcome to the audience, was finally in-
corporated as a factor to be considered
in the determination of the obscenity of
materials.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his opinion con-
curring in Alberts but dissenting in Roth,
also took the position to which he has
consistently adhered and to which he
returned so forcefully in Ginsberg:2
We must distinguish between Federal
laws and State laws. Because the Fed-
22Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
2 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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eral Government has no police power as
such over sexual matters, and because
the Federal Government is more strictly
controlled by the prohibition of the First
Amendment than is any State, and be-
cause any Federal control of obscenity
would necessarily involve a single stand-
ard for the whole nation (which would
be tolerable only for the worst hard-core
pornography), it follows that the Fed-
eral Government must be limited in the
area of obscenity to the control of hard-
core pornography only;2 4 but the States
need not observe the same limitation. In
concurring in Ginsberg, Mr. Justice Har-
lan took the occasion to develop what,
in his self-styled "functional" approach,
the State limitation under the Federal Con-
stitution should be: simply not to be-
come "prudishly overzealous". This tol-
erant limitation, of course, would give
the States a great deal more leeway than
they now have under the Federal con-
stitutional limitations of Roth and the
later cases adding to the Roth stand-
ards for obscenity.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined
by Mr. Justice Black, took the position
to which they have consistently adhered:
One must distinguish as sharply as pos-
sible between expression and antisocial
conduct. Owing to the First Amend-
ment, which covers any and every form
of mere expression (except libel?), no
government in this country may control
mere expression, including obscene ex-
pression as defined by the majority. An-
24In his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. at 197 (1964), Mr. Justice
Stewart agreed, but extended this limitation to
State and local law as well.'
OBSCENITY
tisocial conduct only is the proper area
for governmental control. Occasionally,
expression may be inseparably brigaded
with antisocial conduct; only if, and only
to the extent that, this is the case, may
government control expression. Possibly,
if it could be proved by scientifically ver-
ifiable evidence that a certain form of
expression will be translated into overt
antisocial conduct, government might be
able to control that form of expression
to the extent necessary to prevent the
cause from producing the effect.2 5 The
dissenters, therefore, denied the validity
of each of the three grounds advanced in
the opinion of the Court to support the
holding that obscene expression was not
within First Amendment protection: 2r
(I) Not only has the Court never so held
(a point which the opinion of the Court
conceded),.but no form of expression ex-
cept the libelous utterance in Beau-
25This hint appears again as a possible nega-
tive inference in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360
U.S. 684 (1959). In that case, the Court held
that, with respect to a film which was not
obscene and which was therefore within First
Amendment protection, the mere advocacy of
the idea that adultery (a crime under State
law), under certain circumstances, was socially
acceptable and approved conduct for a mar-
ried person, without any effort in the manner
of presentation of that idea to incite anyone to
commit adultery, could not constitutionally be
suppressed by government. The negative in-
ference that an incitational manner of pre-
sentation of that idea might constitutionally be
suppressed is, of course, subject to the usual
infirmity of negative inferences, and no reference
is made as to the type of evidence which would
be required to demonstrate the incitational
character of the material.
20 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
et seq. (1957).
harnais 27 has ever been held to be out-
side First Amendment protection; nor
do any prior decisions support the con-
clusion that obscenity has always been
assumed to be outside First Amendment
protection (or, as expressed in the Gins-
berg dissent: 2  I cannot interpret oc-
casional utterances suggesting that ob-
scenity was not protected by the First
Amendment as considered expressions of
the views of any particular Justices of
this Court). (2) As to freedom of ex-
pression, the First Amendment is literal-
ly all-encompassing: "No law" means no
law. (3) The functional ground is in-
valid since neither a court nor a com-
munity has any adequate basis for judg-
ing that a mere expression has no re-
deeming social importance, because no
scientifically verifiable evidence is avail-
able to support that judgment, and no
other type of evidence will suffice.
I have always had difficulty in under-
standing this insistence on scientifically
verifiable evidence. My difficulty has
been in determining whether it is intend-
ed to apply only to the control of ma-
terial within First Amendment protection
or equally to the control of material not
within First Amendment protection. If
to the latter, I have already protested the
application of any such requirement to
material protected solely by the substan-
tive due process test of the Fourteenth
Amendment . 2  The evidence alluded to
in the opinion of the Court in Roth in
27 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
28 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 654
n.4 (1968).
29Levy, A Position on the Control of Ob-
scenity, 51 Ky. L.J. 641, 646-48 (1963).
support of the conclusion that obscene
expression, as there defined, has always
been regarded as wholly lacking any re-
deeming social importance was the opin-
ion evidence of the Federal and State
legislatures as manifested in their enact-
ment of anti-obscenity criminal statutes
to express the public policy of their
respective jurisdictions and, incidentally,
as re-manifested in their uniform re-en-
actment of such statutes after their ex-
isting statutes had been fatally flawed by
the constitutional requirement of scienter
in Smith v. California.30  The dissen-
ters rejected this evidence, not, as I now
understand it, because they denied the
probative force of opinion evidence, but
simply because opinion evidence was in-
adequate for the task presented; only
scientifically verifiable evidence would suf-
fice. The opinion of the Court in Roth
appeared to concede that the opinion evi-
dence would be inadequate to support a
"clear and present danger" exception for
material within First Amendment pro-
tection, but thought that it was adequate
to support control of material protected
solely by the substantive due process re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. My difficulty has now been clear-
ed up by the dissenters themselves in
their dissenting opinion in Ginsberg.31
While continuing to insist that all ex-
pression as such (except libel?) is with-
in First Amendment protection (for which
reason they dissent), they state that, if
the governmental control were to be
tested solely by the substantive due
3 0 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
31 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650
(1968) (dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas
and Black).
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process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment alone, they would have no
difficulty in sustaining its constitutionality
under prior decisions because many per-
sons think that obscene publications have
a harmful effect on the young, for which
reason the New York Legislature can
not be deemed wholly irrational in en-
acting the control. Hence, they accept
the opinion evidence of "modern Com-
stockians" as adequate to support the
judgment of the New York Legislature
under the substantive due process test of
the Fourteenth Amendment, at least in
the absence of scientifically verifiable
counter-evidence which conclusively es-
tablishes the fallacy of the opinion.
(B) Subsequent United States Su-
preme Court cases both added to and re-
fined the standards to be used in iden-
tifying the obscene:
(1) In 1959, Smith3 2 added, as
a requirement for the Federal constitu-
tionality of a State criminal statute, the
element of scienter, i.e., the statute must
require, as an essential element of the
crime of possessing or dealing in ob-
scene materials, that the accused know, or
be reasonably chargeable with having
known, the nature of the contents of
the material. Some ramifications of this
requirement still remain undecided. It
is not yet entirely clear that anything less
than actual knowledge will suffice. And
several jurisdictions have created rebut-
table presumptions as to the existence of
the required knowledge, the Federal con-
stitutionality of which presumptions has
not yet been tested.
:-Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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(2) In 1962, Manual Enterprises 33
extended the requirement of scienter to
Federal non-criminal law (a postal reg-
ulation). The case involved magazines
intended for male homosexuals. The
Court held that, especially when the fac-
tor of dominant prurient appeal was lim-
ited to a particular group in the com-
munity, the constitutionality of federal
control of the distributor, by means of
postal regulations which banned the use
of the mails for distribution of the
magazines to everybody, required that
the magazines be patently offensive to
contemporary community standards of
decency (which they were not), i.e., that
the indecency of the magazines for the
community as a whole be self-demon-
strating.. 4  Moreover, since the control
involved was a federal postal regulation,
the "community" was the entire nation.
This requirement of patent offensive-
ness to the community as a whole has
since been regarded by the Court as an
additional standard for the identification
of obscenity. I have never been able to
understand this construct of the decision.
In my view, the decision merely repre-
sents an application of the constitutional
principle established by Butler v. Mich-
igan.3 5  In that case, a Michigan crim-
inal statute prohibited the sale to any-
body in the community of publications
which were obscene for children; as the
X' Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962).
34 This decision had been foreshadowed by the
per curiam decision in One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U.S. 371 (1958), holding that a particular
homosexual magazine was not obscene. The
obvious reason was that it did not appeal to
the prurient interest of the average person.
35Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Court correctly held, the statute was an
"over-kill" in that it applied standards
of obscenity for children to the control
of publications for everybody, including
adults for whom the publications might
not be obscene. In Manual Enterprises,
the federal postal regulation banned all
distribution through the mails of publi-
cations which were obscene for male
homosexuals in the community, but
which were not shown to be obscene for
the average person in the community-
thus, an "over-kill." Had it been pos-
sible to identify the male homosexuals in
the community, and had the ban on dis-
tribution been limited in distribution to
them only, the case would have presented
the interesting issue of the "target au-
dience" adaptation of the definition of,
and of the standards for the identification
of, obscene publications; but since such
identification of the distributees was im-
possible, no such issue was presented.
Since, however, children can be reason-
ably identified, the possibility of banning
dissemination to children of materials
obscene for children presented itself, at
least with respect to publications intended
for children as a target audience. More-
over, this consideration suggested a fur-
ther possibility of banning, for distribu-
tion to children, even publications not
intended for children as a target audience
-and so Ginsberg, in which such a ban
was upheld as constitutional. I had al-
ready outlined this potentiality in 1963,36
because such an Illinois statute,' 7 drafted
by a group of lawyer-associates of mine,
had been enacted, only to be vetoed by
.16 Levy, supra note 29, at 644-45 (1963).
37 H.B. 1072, 73 111. Gen. Assembly (1963).
the Governor of Illinois under circum-
stances under which a legislative over-
ride of that veto was impossible. In my
judgment, therefore, the requirement of
"patent offensiveness to the community
as a whole" is not an additional stand-
ard for the identification of the obscene,
but merely an inherent requirement for
any law which prohibits the dissemination
of obscene materials to everyone in the
relevant community.
(3) In 1964, Jacobellis 8 held that
there could be no weighing of dominant
prurient appeal against an element of
redeeming social value so as to over-
balance the latter in order to conclude
that the material was obscene; if the
material had any element of redeeming
social importance, it could not be ob-
scene. Hence, the utter lack of any
redeeming social value is an independent
essential element in identifying any ma-
terial as obscene. In addition, even as
to a State or local law, the relevant
"community" must be the nation as a
whole and not the State or local com-
munity, because the right protected by
the Federal Constitution is necessarily a
nationwide right which cannot be af-
fected by the vagaries of a local com-
munity." Moreover, in the application
of the definition and standards of ob-
scenity to any particular material, the
United States Supreme Court must make
its own independent determination unaf-
fected by the determinations of any jury,
administrative agency, or lower court.
'S Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
89 Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opin-
ion dissociated himself from this position. Id.
at 200-01.
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(4) In 1966, the Court decided three
cases, each of which contributed some-
thing to the evolution of the standards
for the identification of the obscene.
(a) In Memoirs, 0 the Court further
developed its position in Jacobellis by
holding that, where the issue was the ob-
scenity of the material absent the cir-
cumstance of commercial exploitation, the
material must be utterly without redeem-
ing social importance as a third and in-
dependent test in addition to dominant
prurient appeal and patent offensiveness
to the community as a whole. Memoirs,
therefore, represents the latest synthesis by
the Court of the standards to 'be used
for the identification of the obscene. Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice White in
dissent thought that this so-called third
and independent standard was not really
an additional standard, but merely one
factor to be considered in determining
the standard of the dominant prurient ap-
peal of the material taken as a whole.
I am unclear as to whether this may
mean that they subscribe to the "bal-
ancing" view.
(b) In Ginsberg,41 the Court ap-
pears to have evolved a really new and
independent standard for the identification
of obscenity, by virtue of which, in order
to be constitutionally controllable as ob-
scene for the average person in the com-
munity, material need not be obscene
for that average person under all pos-
sible circumstances. If the material is
40A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
'IlGinsberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966).
OBSCENITY
being commercially exploited for its prur-
ient appeal to the average person so
that it becomes the stock in trade of
the business of pandering, then, in that
circumstance, the material is obscene for
the average person even though, absent
such circumstance, it would not be.
4 2
This advertence to one circumstance at-
tending the dissemination of the material,
and not solely to the nature of the ma-
terial itself, as a standard to be used
in the determination of whether the ma-
terial is obscene, is new.
Several of the experts in the law of
obscenity with whom I have discussed
the case are inclined to regard it as a
freak case, explicable basically by the
Court's reaction to the bold effrontery of
Mr. Ginsberg in nationally advertising in
advance that, under the Court's own
standards of obscenity, no law could con-
stitutionally control his publication, which
would be the creme de la creme of
erotica. But this cynical view is, of
course, unacceptable.
The fact is that, from the very be-
ginning, the Chief Justice had emphasized
that, in his view, the vice to be con-
trolled, and the only vice which govern-
ment could constitutionally control, was
precisely the commercial exploitation of
the morbid and shameful craving for ma-
terials having a prurient effect-a craving
which (though he did not say so) he
may have felt was latent in the average
person. Now faced with a blatant ex-
42 The reason it would not be obscene might be
either because its dominant theme did not
appeal to the prurient interest of the average
person or because it could not be said to have
no redeeming social importance.
ample of that vice, the fact that the
very standards by which the Court had
so meticulously circumscribed and delim-
ited controllable obscenity might make
government powerless to deal with that
vice, must have been a bit of a shock,
especially when the exploiter himself had
confidently predicted that result in ad-
vance in national advertising. But there
was, of course, the hint in Kingsley Pic-
tures 43 that the manner of presentation
of an idea might be significant in de--
termining its controllability. So the cir-
cumstance of the manner of disseminating
an idea might be significant in determin-
ing its obscenity-might in fact tip the
scales in a borderline case so that, with
the circumstance of pandering, material
would be obscene which, absent that cir-
cumstance, would not. In addition, that
particular circumstance of pandering has
a direct relevance to at least two of the
three independent standards summarized
in Memoirs 14 as necessary for the con-
clusion that material is obscene: it makes
the material even more patently offensive
to current community standards of de-
cency than it might otherwise be; and
the purveyor himself makes it clear that
he has no interest in any redeeming so-
cial importance which the material might
have, so that the law need then pay no
more attention to this factor than he
did. Hence, the holding in Ginsberg that,
given the circumstance of pandering, ma-
terial which might not otherwise be ob-
scene becomes so.
42 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
44A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
(c) In Mishkin,4" there was again the
circumstance of pandering but primarily
to a target audience of homosexuals and
lesbians. Since the law involved banned
the dissemination of "obscene" materials
to everyone in the community and not
merely to homosexuals and lesbians, the
case presents a curious anti-position of
Ginsberg against Manual Enterprises-
of the relative significance of the cir-
cumstance of pandering, even though pri-
marily to a target audience, against the
standard of patent offensiveness to cur-
rent community standards of decency,
where dissemination of the materials was
banned to everybody in the community.
The circumstance of pandering prevailed,
even though limited primarily to the tar-
get audience-an impressive tribute to the
strength of the factor of commercial ex-
ploitation in determining the obscenity
of materials for the average person in
the community, although it is not as clear
here as it was in Manual Enterprises that
the material did not appeal to the prurient
interest of the average person in the com-
munity. The case is not an "adapted
audience" case because the New York
statute made no effort to adapt the
standards of obscenity to sexual deviates
and then to limit the ban on dissemina-
tion to those deviates only. The case is
really much more dramatic than that, be-
cause it holds that materials obscene
for deviates may fall within the definition
of materials obscene for the average per-
son without any showing to that effect
where the additional circumstance of pan-
dering exists.
45 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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With the above review of the evolution
of the standards for the identification of
obscene materials, we are now in a po-
sition to appreciate the Ginsberg case,
in which the ban on dissemination of
materials obscene for youth (the adjusted
or adaptive audience) was restricted to
dissemination to youth only (i.e., to the
very same audience to which the defin-
ition and standards of the obscene had
been adapted, thus avoiding the con-
stitutional flaw in Butler 46 and, I think,
in Manual Enterprises),"7 but in which
the ban extended, not merely to materials
intended for dissemination to youth only
(the target audience factor) but to ma-
terials intended for dissemination to
everyone in the community. I must, how-
ever, as a final piece of background,
alert the reader to the fact that the opinion
in Ginsberg treats the constitutional issue
primarily in terms of the constitutionally
protected freedom of the youth, i.e., of
the expressionee rather than of the ex-
pressioner. This twist is involved owing
to the fact that freedom of expression is
viewed as necessarily involving both the
expressioner and the expressionee. If the
protected freedom of a minor-expressionee
may constitutionally be more restricted
than the protected freedom of an adult-
expressionee, that constitutional restriction
on the minor-expressionee exerts a re-
flex impact on the protected freedom of
the expressioner (in this case, Ginsberg).
Hence, Mr. Ginsberg has a personal stake
in defending the unrestricted freedom of
the minor-expressionee, and we are treat-
" Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
4 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962).
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ed to the anomaly of watching Mr. Gins-
berg fight valiantly for the constitution-
ally protected freedom of a youth who
(together with his parent) couldn't care
less and actually doesn't want the free-
dom which Mr. Ginsberg is trying to
obtain for him-a situation calculated to
produce a mild schizophrenia in an un-
alerted reader.
In Ginsberg, the Court deals with a
New York penal law enacted in 19 65.48
Section 1 contains the definitions of all
terms used. Section 2 provides that it
is unlawful for any person knowingly to
sell to a minor
(a) any visual representation which de-
picts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-
masochistic abuse and which is
harmful to minors; or
(b) any printed matter containing any-
thing in paragraph (a) or con-
taining explicit and detailed verbal
descriptions or narrative accounts
of sexual conduct, sexual excite-
ment or sado-masochistic abuse and
which, taken as a whole, is harmful
to minors.
Section 4 provides that violation of the
statute is a misdemeanor (the maximum
punishment for which is one year's im-
prisonment or a fine of $500 or both).
The key phrase "harmful to minors"
is defined in section 1 as follows: that
quality of any description or representa-
tion, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-mas-
ochistic abuse, when it (i) predominantly
appeals to the prurient, shameful or mor-
48 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 484-h, as amended, N.Y.
PEN. LAW §§ 235.20-235.22.
bid interest of minors; and (ii) is patent-
ly offensive to prevailing standards in the
adult community as a whole with respect
to what is suitable material for minors;
and (iii) is utterly without redeeming so-
cial importance for minors.
On each of two days in October, 1965,
a sixteen-year-old boy (enlisted to do so
by his mother, according to Mr. Justice
Fortas, so that Ginsberg could be prose-
cuted) picked from a display rack in
Ginsberg's luncheonette store two "girlie"
magazines of a type indistinguishable from
magazines which the United States Su-
preme Court had already held not to be
obscene for adults,'4 9 paid Ginsberg for
the magazines, and walked out of the
store. Charged on information, Gins-
berg was tried without a jury and found
guilty; the trial court found that the
magazines contained pictures depicting
female "nudity" (as defined in the stat-
ute), which pictures were "harmful to
minors" (as defined in the statute), and
that Ginsberg knowingly sold them to a
minor. The conviction was affirmed by
the Appellate Term of the Supreme
Court, and the New York Court of Ap-
peals denied leave to appeal. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed.
The opinion of the Court is as fol-
lows:
(1) The state of the case is:
(a) Ginsberg contends solely that New
York has no power, under the Federal
Constitution, to adapt to minors the
three-pronged test of obscenity as formu-
lated in Memoirs for everyone because
49 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
the constitutional protection accorded to
a citizen cannot be made to depend on
whether that citizen is an adult or a
minor (citing Meyer,50  Pierce,51  and
Barnette 52 as analogous invasions of the
constitutionally protected rights of min-
ors).
(b) New York contends that it does
have such power under the Federal
Constitution, because its own interest in
the welfare of its children-citizens enables
it to exercise its police power to bar the
distribution to minors of publications, the
distribution of which to adults it could
not constitutionally bar. On that issue,
the New York Court of Appeals has held
for the State in Bookcase, Inc. v. Brod-
crick 1': publications which are con-
stitutionally protected for distribution to
adults are not necessarily constitutionally
protected for distribution to minors, be-
cause the concept of constitutionally un-
protected publications may vary accord-
ing to the social group to whom the pub-
lications are directed or from whom they
are quarantined.
(2) We need not consider the impact
of constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression upon the totality of the re-
lationship between a minor and the State
(citing Gault) .4 The issue here is mere-
-
0 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
51 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
52 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
53 Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71,
218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1966).
54 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). I take
this citation to mean that Ginsberg and Gault
are not at odds, because different constitutional
rights of minors were involved.
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ly whether New York may constitution-
ally accord to minors a more restricted
freedom of expression than it must con-
stitutionally accord to adults. We hold
that it may, and that this statute does
not over-exercise that power.
(3) A definition of obscenity (other-
wise constitutionally unobjectionable)
based on a prurient appeal to minors does
not violate the constitutionally protected
freedom of minors, but merely adjusts
the constitutional concept of obscenity to
social reality by permitting an assess-
ment of its prurient appeal in terms of
the sexual interests of minors (citing
Mishkin and New York's Bookcase, Inc.).
(4) We reject any analogy to Meyer,
Pierce, or Barnette. The applicable pre-
cedent is Prince 5: the power of the
State to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond its authority over adults,
even where the crux is the invasion of
constitutionally protected freedoms.
(5) In this case, there exists a super-
vening State interest in the regulation of
expression sold to children owing to the
factor of their immaturity. Hence, if
it is rational for the State to find, as the
New York Legislature did, that the pub-
fished materials, as defined, are "harm-
ful to minors" because they constitute "a
basic factor in impairing the ethical and
moral development of children and a
clear and present danger to the people
of the State," then two interests of the
State justify its action: legal support of
parents in the discharge of their primary
responsibility for the welfare of their
55 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
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children; and the State's own independent
interest in the welfare of its citizen-
children.
(6) Is it rational for the State so to
find? It is doubtful if the legislative
finding quoted above is an accepted scien-
tific fact, but the concensus of the studies
made is that the causal link is neither
proved nor disproved. A clear and
present danger is not required in order
to justify the finding because obscenity,
as adequately defined, is not within the
protection of the First Amendment.
Hence, the Federal Constitution requires
merely that the New York Legislature not
be irrational in so finding. Since the
finding has not been disproved, it can-
not be said to be irrational. The Four-
teenth Amendment alone does not require
scientifically certain criteria.
(7) There is no unconstitutional vague-
ness involved because the statutory defi-
nition of "harmful to minors" is virtually
identical with the definition of obscenity
in Memoirs," and the New York judicial
construction of "knowingly" operates to
prohibit not innocent but calculated pur-
veyance of filth to minors.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart noted that the First Amend-
ment protects freedom of expression in
order to preserve a free trade in ideas,
and that it protects both the freedom of
the expressioner and the freedom of the
expressionee in order to protect a society
of free choice. But, he said, the free-
dom of the expressionee assumes a de-
veloped capacity to choose in the expres-
5'; A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966).
sionee; if that is absent, government may
regulate the expressioner to prevent him
from foisting his views upon a captive
audience. A child is like a captive audi-
ence because he does not have a fully
developed capacity for choice. Hence,
the State may deprive a child of rights
of which it could not deprive an adult
(e.g., the right to vote; the right to
marry).
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas, in which Mr. Justice Black
joined, has already been presented. Mr.
Justice Fortas, in dissent, has, as I see
it, just one principal point, viz., non-
pandering book selling of publications
which are indistinguishable from those al-
ready held non-obscene for adults should
not be a hazardous occupation. Apropos
of this observation, I know that some-
thing akin to this consideration was the
basic reason for the veto by the Governor
of Illinois of the Illinois statute enacted
in 1963.57 That statute incorporated
(though not with equal precision of
drafting) the same concept as the New
York statute in adapting the definition
of obscene to minors while also limit-
ing the ban on dissemination to minors.
The thinking behind the veto was that to
compel booksellers to conform to two
different standards of the obscene (the
adult standard and the minor's standard)
in the operation of their business would
make bookselling a hazardous occupation
which, in the absence of scientifically
verifiable evidence of any harm to minors,
was not worth the doing.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring
opinion, surveyed the disagreements which
57H.B. 1072, 73 111. Gen. Assembly (1963).
still exist among the members of the
Court as to various aspects of this in-
tractable constitutional problem even
after eleven years of reflection, and
noted among the American public an
utter bewilderment as to particular de-
terminations which the Court has made.
He felt that the United States Supreme
Court had been reduced to mere second-
guessing of state courts, and that in rare
instances only was there any substantial
interest in free speech at stake. His
conclusion was that there could be no
improvement until it is recognized that
the matter of obscenity is of primarily
state concern, and that the Federal Con-
stitution tolerates much more discretion
in the states than in the Federal Govern-
ment, and is even more tolerant of state
action in respect of juveniles. His func-
tional solution is to limit federal regula-
tion to hard-core pornography only, but
to limit the states only when they are
prudishly overzealous.
Without underestimating the significance
of Mr. Justice Harlan's disquieting ob-
servations and the great practical value
of his functional solution, I am never-
theless struck by what I consider a rela-
tively rapid evolutionary case develop-
ment of the substantive concept of ob-
scenity to its present degree of sophistica-
tion. I view the notable refinement, in
little more than a decade, of the stan-
dards determining obscenity as a fine ex-
ample of the genius of our law. Fur-
ther refinement and adjustment, of course,
still lie ahead and the frustrating "grey
area" of specific application will always
exist, but the development of our con-
stitutional law by the cases in all four
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categories of the generic problem of
controlling obscenity has been remarkable
in the time involved. Equally remark-
able is how much of this development
was foreshadowed in the Roth case which
began it.
In short, I get the impression that
the constitutional law of obscenity has
"grown up". In these two latest cases,
there is even an air of urbanity in the
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, as though
he now recognizes that his view of the
all-encompassing scope of the First
Amendment is a lost cause over which
he can finally shrug his shoulders. In
reaction, perhaps, he comes very close
to equating the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive due process test for the con-
stitutional validity of a legislative finding
(opinion) to the test for an insane de-
lusion on the part of a testator in the
law of wills; but I sense more of a wry
humor than of bitterness in the reac-
tion. His basic belief comes through in
his gibes at the "modern Comstockians",
who follow their preceptor in entertain-
ing the opinion that the obscene publica-
tion has a harmful effect on the young,
whereas the Justice doubts the wisdom
of trying by law to put the fresh, evanes-
cent, natural blooming of sex into the
category of "sin." Imagine Comstock's
dismay on learning that he is the pre-
ceptor of the standards for the identifica-
tion of obscenity now summarized in
Memoirs, and the preceptor for the per
curiam determinations as to the non-
obscenity of specific materials involved
therein. As for the Justice, perhaps we
may even anticipate that he will yet
(Continued on page 86)
edge and experience, not only of the
Church, but of all mankind, especially
as available in modern disciplines, i.e.,
psychology, sociology, history, etc. Or-
ganic assimilation of these resources will




realize that legislatures base their anti-
obscenity statutes, not on the private
moral standards involved in "sin", but
on the public moral standards involved in
the awareness (opinion) of the average
man that, sin or no sin for the in-
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(5) In all these respects, the medium
of mass communication offers multiple
possibilities. For this reason the process
of developing new formulations of law
should not only be non-secretive, and in
the public domain, but should in princi-
ple receive as wide publicity as possible
during the period of formulation.
dividual, obscenity, as adequately defined,
in the long run erodes public moral values
on which the common good is based.
Far from being disappointed, then, I
am encouraged that the "intractable" legal
problem of obscenity is showing signs of
becoming tractable-another tribute to
the capacity of our constitutional law for
evolutionary development.
